Posts Tagged ‘theory’

Quotes of quotes of quotes of quotes, 5/5

May 5, 2010

From Nicole Brenez’s “The Ultimate Journey” (which, by the way, is a must-read for anyone—er, anybody—who’s into this sort of stuff):

Modern theories of cinema in fact unceasingly return to “the simplest question: the body, how do you find it?” The great analyses of the last years have looked into the ways in which film presupposes, elaborates, gives or abstracts a body, not hesitating to pose again such primitive questions as what texture is it (flesh, marble, plaster, affect, doxa)? What is its framework (skeleton, semblance, becoming, a structure of formlessness [plastiques de l’informe])? What destroys it (the other, history, deforming its contours)? What kind of community does its gestures allow it to envision (people, collectivity [collection], alignment with the same)? To what regime of the visible has it submitted (apparition, extinction, haunting)? What is its story really (an adventure, a description, a panoply)? What creature is it at bottom (an organism, an effigy, a cadaver)? In sum, they have explored the ways in which a film invents a figurative logic.

[…] For me the invention of figural analysis for the cinema definitively began in 1979 with Godard’s mise-en-page for his issue 300 of Cahiers and, very precisely, with the montage that argued, “See how Krystyna Janda acts in a bad dream of what used to be October“. Such is the Bazinian exigency maintained in the heart of a type of non-Bazinian analysis that no longer takes the real as second nature or as the second nature of film and which, in every way, does not have the same conception of the real (rather Lacanian these days): to find the way the cinema discovers human experience (and this could be a door as unexpected as Cocteau’s mirror-pools, the anxious face of an actress in a tendentious film [film à thèse], the formless shot of a bus with which nothing can be done) and the way the cinema sets that experience forth naked, in its radical strangeness, in that which is unnameable in it.

Getting closer to object-oriented film theory

May 3, 2010

Larval Subjects’ Levi Bryant responded to my post “Film theory as a form of procrastination,” in which I wondered aloud about how we might analyze shots without discussing the ways in which their form and content acts upon a perceiving viewer. (I gotta emphasize here that I was thinking out loud; if you want to take what a 21-year-old undergrad thinks of film theory seriously, more power to you. All I know is that I know very little.) Bryant seems to be most interested in approaching cinema in terms of how certain films are technologically possible, the philosophical implications of cinematic technologies, and what effects those films/technologies might have upon other objects (or, in OOO lingo, actants) in the world. I’d love to hear what some UW-Madison film students, graduate or otherwise, think of all this.

Film theory as a form of procrastination

May 2, 2010

I’m presently chilling in one of my favorite State St. coffeehouses, “working” on a take-home final exam—I use scare-quotes on “working” because right now my mind is, as always, elsewhere. Earlier today I read these two extremely worthwhile posts by bloggin’ philosopher extraordinaire Levi Bryant, and I encourage y’all to do the same. If I think these posts are especially worth sharing with you, dear reader, it’s because they’re salient examples of Object-Oriented Ontology, a philosophical movement that’s working itself out in the totally open space of the blogosphere.

As I’ve mentioned here before, I think the recent work of Bryant and Graham Harman contains the seeds for a conceptual framework capable of engaging with the non-human aspects of cinema, something that I think film theory will have to address sooner rather than later. So check the posts out (Bryant is an excellent and very lucid writer, so they’re hardly tough-sledding); they inspired me to scribble the following in my notebook after a brief bout of meditation on my fire escape:

“All of the elements of a shot’s mise en scène, all of the non-relational objects within the film frame, are figures of a sort. The figure is the likeness of a material object, whether that likeness is by-design or purely accidental. A shot is a cluster of cinematic figures, an entanglement. Actors and props are by no means the only kinds of cinematic figures—the space that they occupy and navigate is itself a figure. The cinematic figure isn’t just an image of the human body, a translation of the body’s form from spatio-temporal materiality to the ambiguous cinematic mode of being: the cinematic figure is, in Bryant’s terms, a local manifestation of an object situated among other local manifestations of other objects within the film frame. The relations between the figures situated in the frame are also objects in their own right, but these objects aren’t themselves figures. The figure—cinematic or otherwise—is nothing uniquely human; a breast framed in close-up is no less figurative than a cherry red Alfa Romeo Spider framed in long shot. Furthermore, no representation is necessary for figuration—a process that always precedes the presentation of a shot—to take place.”

As you can probably tell, I’ve got a lot of work to do before I can present this very rough complex of ideas with a straight face. In the meantime, it’s worth pointing out how cool it is that theorizing/philosophizing may now be conducted in such an accessible and public space.